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ü Abstract
Basel  III  classifies  government  debt  as  risk  free  while  actual  interest  rates  in  the
European  Union  (EU)  show  large  differences  not  only  because  of  liquidity  but  mainly
because  of  the  risk  of  default,  as  also  reflected  in  credit  default  swaps.  Curiously  such
debt  defaults  may  not  happen  so  that  creditors  do  not  need  to  cover  losses.  The  risk
premium then becomes a reward for  taking a  risk that  does  not materialize.  Contagious
fears  create  risk  premia  that  destabilize  government  debts  and  national  economies.  A
solution  is  to  regard  the  risk  premia  as  potential  redemption  that  turns  into  actual
redemption  when  the  loan  is  served  to  maturity.  A  EU  law  may  make  this  mandatory
without  serious  restrictions  to  the  credit  market.  The  rule  would  be  that  governments
under threat of default would issue only annuity loans with a centrally determined rate of
interest.  The  market  sentiment  of  increased  risk  then  shows  up  in  shorter  maturities.
Governments  that  can  borrow  only  at  shorter  maturities  but  at  higher  annual  liquidity
requirements  meet  with  strong  incentives  to  better  manage their  economies.  The  paper
investigates the conditions involved. An important distinction  appears to exists  between
the  risk  free  rate,  the  credit  default  risk  premium,  the  liquidity  premium and  a  stigma
factor.  While  much  of  the  debate  in  the  EU  seems  to  be  about  reducing  the  risk
premium, the distinction between ex ante risk and ex post redemption allows to identify
that  true  EU  policy  costs  concern  irrational  stigma  factors.  Notably,  aversion  against
Southern  European  debt,  that  differs  from  the  risk  free  rate  and  the  risk  and  liquidity
premiums, has no rational base but can persist because it is rewarded.
Introduction
Basel  III  classifies  government  debt  as  risk  free  while  actual  interest  rates  in  the
European  Union  (EU)  show  large  differences  not  only  because  of  liquidity  but  mainly
because of the risk of default, as also reflected in credit default swaps (CDS). Curiously
such  defaults  may  not  happen  so  that  creditors  do  not  need  to  cover  losses.  The  risk
premium then becomes a reward for  taking a  risk that  does  not materialize.  Contagious
fears  currently  create  risk  premia  that  destabilize  government  debts  and  national
economies,  while  they  increase  private  profits  where  those  are  not  urgently  needed.
Credit  default  swaps  have  been  invented  by  markets  to  both  serve  customers  and  own
profits but the emphasis seems to be on the latter. We should rather be looking for credit
non-default swaps (CNDS) as this is the most frequent situation for government debt.
A  solution  is  to  regard  the  risk  premia  as  potential  redemption  that  turns  into  actual
redemption when the loan is served to maturity when the risk thus does not materialize.
A EU law may make this mandatory without serious restrictions to the credit market.
We first look at the principle and then at the economic conditions that would be required
to  make  it  work.  The  idea  will  be  grasped  immediately  by  finance  experts  but  the
exposition  below targets  highschool students  and might perhaps also  serve Members of
Parliament.  For  this  reason  we first  restate  the  simple  financial  mathematics  of  a  bond
issue  with  a  fixed  rate  of  interest.  The  idea  indeed  can  be  implemented  with  standard
annuities rather than complex instruments.
The  discussion  can  best  be  seen  in  the  context  of  Colignatus  (2011ab)  “An  economic
plan for Europe”. Some authors propose Eurozone bonds to equalize rates of interest and
spread  risks  of  defaults.  In  my  analysis  it  is  better  to  use  market  signals  on  the
performance  and  risk  of  individual  governments.  There  is  also  an  issue  of  timing.  The
October  26-27 plan  to  have a  50% haircut  on  Greek debt  held  by private  agents  seems
unwise  because  of  policy  errors  made  in  the  past  and  because  the  Treaty  on  the  euro
does not clearly deal with defaults. On short notice part of the Greek and Italian debt can
be absorbed within the monetary system, provided that those governments provide some
collateral as explained in that economic plan, to satisfy the no-bailout condition. For the
longer term the Treaty can be amended for  defaults.  The present  discussion  is  intended
for that. Generally the default will not concern the whole debt but only a percentage - the
haircut. 
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We  use  Cool  (1999)  “The  Economics  Pack.  Applications  of  Mathematica”  for  our
formulas.
Debt and redemption
Notation
The assumption of a flat (constant) rate of interest suffices to explain the mechanism.
We  assume a  sequence  of  equal  periods  with  a  well  defined  periodical  payment  and  a
final  payment  at  maturity,  with  all  payments  at  the  end  of  the  period.  We  use  the
following symbols:
   †  r rate of interest per period (coupon rate i) 
   †  m maturity (number of periods)
   †  p instalment or periodical payment
   †  w payment at maturity (principal, worth)
   †  v present value (capital equivalent at the beginning)
Cashflow object
The basic object is a cash flow of p per period, for m periods, and a final payment of w.
In effect,  someone has borrowed w, pays periodic interest  p at the coupon interest  rate i
=  p / w, and returns the loan at maturity m.
example = {p → 10 Euro/Year, m → 10 Year, w → 100 Euro}; 
cf = CashFlow[p, m, w] /. example
CashFlow
10 Euro
Year
, 10 Year, 100 Euro
A bullit  loan  has  annual  interest  payment at  rate  i  without  redemption,  and  at  maturity
the redemption of the principal.
bul = Bullit[i / Year, m, w] /. example
CashFlow
100 Euro i
Year
, 10 Year, 100 Euro
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Discounting 
Discounting  is  not  immediately  relevant  for  the  present  discussion.  It  can  help
understanding  the  formulas  to  mention  it  anyway.  The  Present  Value  differs  from  the
principal if the coupon rate i differs from the market rate r.
With a cash flow of p[t] per period, we can discount each payment with a discount factor
1
H1+ rLt
. Since we assume equal payments, p[t] = p, we can add all discount factors:
total[r_, m_]  =  Sum[1 / (1+r)^t,  {t, m}] 
Hr + 1L-m HHr + 1Lm - 1L
r
capital == PV[Bullit[i, m, w], r]
capital 
i w H1 - Hr + 1L-mL
r
+ w Hr + 1L-m
Annuity table
Suppose you borrow capital  v now. Without  intermediate  interest  payments, you would
have  to  repay  f  v  with  factor  f  =  H1+ rLm  at  maturity.  Suppose  that  you  only  pay  w  at
maturity. Then the remainder f v - w must be paid as interest or redemption in the period
before. If the periodical payment is constant then it is called an annuity. A table contains
payments of interest and amortisation, and remaining debt.
Suppose that a person is willing to pay an annuity of 30 per year for a period of 3 years,
and an additional final sum of 100 at the end of those 3 years as well. When the rate of
interest is 10% then the present value is almost 150. 
Present value = 149.737
period payment interest redemption debt
1 30.00 14.97 15.03 134.71
2 30.00 13.47 16.53 118.18
3 30.00 11.82 18.18 100.00
The new mechanism
The new mechanism changes an ex ante risk premium into an ex post redemption if the
risk does not materialize. 
In effect,  the  original  bullit  bond can  be recalculated  as  an  annuity  bond.  The  new EU
law  then  would  be  that  governments  under  threat  of  default  would  issue  only  annuity
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loans. While creditor and debtor can in principle bargain on the rates of interest and risk,
a  regulator  may  cap  the  rate  of  interest  to  eliminate  one  degree  of  freedom.  This
regulation  may  be  a  mere  law  with  no  strings  attached.  See  the  section  below  on
regulation.
It is a bit sobering that all this discussion in the EU about the Greek haircut, first of 21%
in July  and then  of  50% last  October,  essentially  boils  down to  change a  bullit  into  an
annuity  scheme,  plus  the  willingness  to  cap  the  effective  rate  of  interest  to  the  market
risk free rate.
Assume a 5 year loan of 100 (million or billion) at 5% interest for risk free governments,
as assumed in the  finance textbooks and Capital  Asset  Pricing Model  (CAPM). Let the
risk  premium be  10% for  a  government at  risk.  After  5  years  roughly 50% of  the  loan
will be paid in terms of risk premium. If the loan is served to maturity then the risk does
not  materialize,  and  the  risk  premium  payments  can  be  counted  as  redemption.
Effectively the calculation gives an annuity table. At maturity a remaining debt of 44.74
has to be redeemed instead of the bullit value of 100.
Present value = 100.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 15.00 5.00 10.00 90.00
2 15.00 4.50 10.50 79.50
3 15.00 3.98 11.03 68.47
4 15.00 3.42 11.58 56.90
5 15.00 2.84 12.16 44.74
Suppose  there  is  a  default  around  year  3.  At  the  end  of  year  2  almost  20%  has  been
repaid and at the end of year 3 more than 30% has been repaid. The risk premium will be
based  upon  fears  about  both  the  size  of  the  potential  haircut  and  the  moment  when  it
might occur.  In this  case,  an implied haircut  of  50% over 5 years  puts  a  ceiling  on  the
expectations.  Given  the  risk  free  rate  the  risk  premium  affects  maturity.  If  the  risk  of
default  is  judged  to  be  large,  the  creditor  will  agree  only  with  shorter  maturities.  At
renewal of the loan the risk can be smaller, resulting in a longer maturity, or the risk can
be higher, resulting in an even shorter maturity.
The  scheme  limits  the  scope  for  creditors  to  spread  risks.  In  the  present  situation  a
creditor might collect risk premia from say 10 customers to cover the actual default of 1
of  them.  Good  customers  effectively  pay  the  redemption  of  the  failing  customer.
Customers can have different rates of interest including risk premia depending upon risk
status.  A bit  irrational,  a  customer with high risk may pay a  higher premium, enlarging
the risk, and, when the risk does not materialize, this weaker customer contributes  most
to the redemption of the customer who fails. In the new situation the rates of interest and
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risk  are  (in  principle)  both  negotiated  between  creditor  and  debtor  on  an  individual
basis. If the risk materializes then there might be a subsequent negotiation on the size of
the  haircut,  while  the  creditor  could  still  recover  possible  losses  from overall  proceeds
from various customers, though without the ability to label risk free loans as risks.
The  creditor  can  still  diversify  the  risk  of  default  by  taking  a  portfolio  of  different
maturities.  In the example above,  suppose that  1/5th is  kept of  each of these  lines.  The
low risk premium cashed in the first  tranche is balanced by a much larger risk premium
cashed over time in the last tranche. On average a risk premium of about 25% is cashed
and  thus  a  haircut  of  about  25%  can  be  carried  without  a  loss  to  the  normal  risk  free
earnings on interest.
The  debtor  can  negotiate  for  a  lower  rate  of  interest  or  a  longer  period  by  offering
collateral. Credit default swaps should rather be forbidden since they create the sense of
security associated with money, which is the monopoly of the Central Bank.
Application to Germany and Greece
The  ECB  (2011a)  gives  “the  latest  available  harmonised  long-term  interest  rates  for
assessing  convergence  among  the  EU  Member  States.  The  rates  are  secondary  market
yields of government bonds with a remaining maturity close to ten years.” October 2011
gives an  annual  rate  of  2% for  Germany and  18% for  Greece  so  that  the  liquidity  and
risk premium for Greece is 16%. The overall liquidity premium may be estimated as the
difference  in  October  2010  between  Germany  2.35%  and  Holland  2.58%  or  Finland
2.63% and thus as 0.25%. 
The ex ante risk premium for Greece can be regarded as ex post redemption, if the loan
is  served  to  maturity  indeed.  Suppose  that  Greece  takes  a  loan  of  10,000  million  euro.
Markets  now  demand  18%  but  if  Greece  serves  the  loan  till  maturity  then  the  proper
market rate  will  be  the  German rate  of  2% plus  the  liquidity  premium of  0.25%. If  the
loan is served to maturity then it actually is redeemed already in the 6th year. Apparently
a  haircut  of  50%  is  expected  already  in  the  3rd  year.  For  a  portfolio  of  different
maturities the non-losing haircut would still be 50% (because the final debt level is 0).
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Present value = 9998.06
period payment interest redemption debt
1 1800.00 224.96 1575.04 8423.01
2 1800.00 189.52 1610.48 6812.53
3 1800.00 153.28 1646.72 5165.81
4 1800.00 116.23 1683.77 3482.05
5 1800.00 78.35 1721.65 1760.39
6 1800.00 39.61 1760.39 0.00
This  looks  decidedly  simpler  than  what  the  Eurozone  has  concocted  till  now,  see  the
critical Cabral (2011) and Hau (2011).
A higher  annuity  causes  more  distress  for  a  government  that  is  already  short  in  funds.
The  advantage however is  that  the  horizon becomes shorter,  while  the  effective  rate  of
interest  is  under  regulation  from  a  central  regulator.  This  current  rate  of  18%  seems
rather excessive and it derives mainly from the present crisis,  while a revised Treaty on
the  euro  will  have  more  balancing  rules  in  an  earlier  stage.  The  regulator  would  start
with  such  2.25%  but  when  it  appears  that  new  loans  are  made  to  cover  payments  on
older  loans,  then  it  could  raise  that  rate.  The  regulated  rate  namely  controls  the  real
losses suffered by the regulated government.
The advantage for Greece would be huge. If it would take a bullit loan of 10,000 million
at  18% for  10  years,  then the  present  value taken at  the  risk  free  German rate  plus  the
liquidity premium amounts to almost 24 billion.  Greece thus pays a risk premium of 14
billion,  while,  with  a  proper  monetary  and  financial  management,  that  risk  need  not
materialize. The problem is not just Greece but also the Treaty on the euro. 
PV@CashFlow@1800, 10, 10000D, 0.0225D
23 964.3
To regulate or not to regulate
The proposed scheme relies on the strict difference between the market risk free rate and
the risk premium, as used in finance textbooks and CAPM, while we allowed for a third
aspect  of  market  liquidity,  meaning  that  German  bonds  may  sell  easier  because  of  a
better  developed market than for  Greek bonds.  It  seems that  there  may also be a fourth
factor, call it stigma, bear market sentiment, country aversion, so that a country may fall
prey  to  speculations  on  such  sentiments.  Such  a  stigma  effect  can  be  the  only
explanation why investors might require a rate of interest  for Greece that is higher than
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2.25% even when the risk of default does not materialize. 
Assume a  Greek market stigma of 3%.  Then the  Greek interest  rate  rises  to  5.25% and
the scheme to turn the ex ante risk premium into ex post redemption becomes as follows.
Greece has to pay one term more, or loses 1,800 million because investors have lost trust
and  speculators  fuel  that.  In  a  way  it  is  an  irrational  sentiment  in  the  market  but  it
becomes rational again because it is rewarded by higher proceeds.
Present value = 10 321.8
period payment interest redemption debt
1 1800.00 541.89 1258.11 9063.65
2 1800.00 475.84 1324.16 7739.49
3 1800.00 406.32 1393.68 6345.82
4 1800.00 333.16 1466.84 4878.97
5 1800.00 256.15 1543.85 3335.12
6 1800.00 175.09 1624.91 1710.21
7 1800.00 89.79 1710.21 0.00
For  regulation  the  important  issue  is  the  cost  at  the  EU level.  There  are  three  kinds  of
regulated markets:
(1)  The  EU-costless  regulated  but  uncapped  market.  The  law  only  states  that
unmaterialized risk is translated into an annuity. Creditor and debtor negotiate about the
split in risk free rate and risk premium. Stigma effects cannot be avoided. In the current
situation it must be doubted however whether the Greek stigma really causes a true total
rate of interest of 18%. It likely is lower.
(2) The EU-costless regulated but capped market.  The law also instructs the regulator to
cap the rate of interest, either with rules or discretion. The cap would consist of the risk
free rate (Germany) plus the liquidity premium plus a tolerable level of stigma. It would
be  interesting  to  see  what  the  maturity  would  become  if  stigma  is  set  at  zero,  and
whether  Greece  would  be able  to  raise  sufficient  funds.  In some respect  the  cap would
be exactly at the market value (case 1) to generate sufficient funds but there may also be
learning effects  that allow a lower stigma to sink in. The country itself  may make costs
to achieve a lower stigma but it would be EU-costless.
(3)  The  regulated  and  capped  market  with  costs  for  the  EU.  Regulation  would  likely
become  costly  if  there  is  a  common  policy  to  drive  down  stigma.  Suppose  that  the
regulator  caps  stigma  to  1%  while  the  market  rate  would  be  3%.  It  depends  upon  the
supply  schedule  but  say  that  Greece  then  only  covers  30%  of  its  demand  for  funds.  It
would  need  70%  of  funds  from  non-market  sources.  Here  ideas  on  adaptation  of  the
European Central  Bank (ECB), the introduction  of Eurozone bonds, or the extension of
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) enter the discussion. 
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With this  analysis  it  is  interesting  to  observe that  much debate  in  the  EU seemed to be
about  regulating  default  risk  while  it  actually  was  about  regulating  irrational  market
stigma that fuels on itself since it is rewarded.
I have the impression that others have made similar remarks about herd behaviour, yet I
also have the impression that  it  puts  the matter in the spotlights  by making the point  in
the context of the option to turn ex ante risk into ex post redemption. Perhaps when this
analysis and cause have been accepted it will become possible to better evaluate the role
of the ECB. Indeed, the ECB move to buy Greek and other debt on the secondary market
can  find  a  motivation  in  the  desire  to  fight  suddenly  high  market  stigma  when  the
fundamental  belief  is  that  there  is  no  cause  for  default.  The  given  argument  of
supporting  the  financial  stability  of  Greece  is  vague  when  there  would  be  no
fundamental  risk  for  default.  Countries  can  do  a  lot  themselves  about  reducing  such
stigma but joining a monetary union eliminates an instrument to handle stigma and thus
there is some responsibility for the union to assist. 
Macro-economic aspects in the EU in 2011
How would  the  Eurozone  be  affected  by  the  new  mechanism ?  Our  main  interests  are
Germany and the average. Judging by the euro yield curve the average rate of interest for
10  year  Eurozone  debt  still  is  fair  at  2.72%  on  average,  ECB  (2011b)  and  Eurostat
(2011). 
The  rate  of  interest  for  German  government  debt  at  2%  is  so  low  because  risk  averse
creditors flee from Southern Europe. Southern Europe still attracts funds, so it mainly is
a  redistribution.  The  apparent  average  of  2.72%  is  0.5%  higher  than  the  2.25%  used
above.  The  increased  sense  of  risk  with  respect  to  Southern  Europe  apparently  has  a
limited impact on the average. Given the limited impact of current fears it  seems fair to
take  the  regulatory  target  rate  indeed  as  2.25%  (Germany +  0.25%)  rather  than  2.75%
(Germany  +  0.75%).  In  the  new  system,  if  countries  under  threat  of  default  would
disbehave then the regulator could indeed assign a higher rate of interest.
The regulator can let  itself  be guided by a formula to establish the rate of interest  to be
used  in  the  annuity  scheme  of  a  government  at  risk  of  default.  With  d  the  Debt/GDP
ratio the rate could be r = 1 + ‰ c Hd - 60L, both in percentages, with coefficient c. At d = 60
we have  r  = 2.  We can  distinguish  operations  in  the  normal  state  around  d  = 60,  with
coefficient c = 0.04, and the current period of crisis with coefficient c = 0.01. The latter
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form can provide stability for the adjustment in the next decade and once debt values are
sustainable then the regime switch takes place.
0 50 100 150 200
DebtêGDP
2
4
6
8
10
Interest
Thus  there  would  be  scope  for  a  EU  regulator  to  oversee  the  rate  of  interest  for  a
member government that threatens to become in default. The 10 year German rate of 2%
would likely  not  be  much affected  since  Germany does  not  accept  more risk  and since
the problem country remains responsible for its own debt. The country pays a price since
the 10 year German rate may become its own 6 year rate.  There is benefit  in regulation
and capping that rate, since it blocks somewhat irrational effects of private profit taking
in current financial markets.
In  the  case  of  Eurozone  bonds,  there  are  various  models.  If  all  countries  use  only
Eurozone  bonds  then  Germany  would  see  a  rise  of  its  rate  from  2%  to  say  the  2.75%
average. The liquidity premium of 0.25% would disappear,  but  the extra risk factor has
to be included that  there  no longer is  a  safe haven in Germany since it  has taken along
the load of other nations. Though one might argue that it already has taken on that load
anyway. Countries may also only partly use Eurozone bonds, e.g. the first  60% of debt,
or alternatively only the current surplus above 60% as a single once-only measure as the
German  Five  Wise  propose  (Bofinger  et  al.  (2011)).  Eurozone  bonds  destroy  the
information  about  individual  performance  and  thus  you  would  think  only  about  partial
application. Setting up a temporary and/or partial system for Eurozone bonds has the risk
that the mechanism gets known and becomes permanent. 
It  is  a  curious  system  that  private  banks  can  borrow  from  the  ECB  at  1%,  use  a
multiplier,  and  loan  to  governments at  18%.  In normal  situations  we  would  like  to  see
governments  benefitting  from seigniorage,  see  Colignatus  (2005),  and  banks  having  to
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compete for funds in the market place, rather than the other way around. The target rate
of interest  would be about the same as the nominal GDP growth, thus r º g, since then
income and wealth would be balanced. With the long term rate anchored in that manner,
the  weight  for  inflation  policy  falls  on  the  short  term  rate  of  interest,  hence  the  term
structure, and bank profits based upon their channelling of short term deposits into long
term loans.
The  approach  suggested here  can  already be started.  Again,  this  discussion  can best  be
seen in  the context  of Colignatus  (2011ab).  Stress  tests  would enhance  our  information
about the system performance.
Conclusion
It  is  useful  to  see  the  issue  at  the  level  of  the  EU  and  not  just  the  Eurozone.  The
proposed scheme has these features:
(1) In the “normal” situation around the Debt / GDP norm of 60% countries pursue their
own debt policies.
(2) If a country comes from the normal situation of Debt / GDP around 60% into another
situation higher than another norm, say 90%, it can be declared under threat of default. It
then restructures its debt into annuity forms where the rate of interest is establised by the
regulator. 
(3)  In the  current  situation  where various EU member states  are under  threat  of default
already  (2)  applies,  though  with  a  more  agreeable  interest  rate  cap  to  allow  recovery
from the rather  severe crisis  we are in.  Healthy people can have brisk measures but  the
recoverating need  careful  treatment.  The  EU-costless  scheme does  not  put  a  burden  on
safe  countries.  It  only  regulates  the  interaction  of  markets  and  problem  countries,  by
reducing irrational and counterproductive feedback loops. 
(4)  The  identification  of  the  stigma  effect  and  counterproductive  market  process
however requires  reevaluation of the Treaty on the euro. Regulation with EU-costs may
actually  be  desirable  to  block  such  counterproductive  processes  rather  than  merely
reduce  them.  This  view  supports  the  earlier  conclusion  in  Colignatus  (2011ab)  that  it
would be better that the EU as a whole gets a proper central bank.
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